Die Absicht, der EWG einzutreten, brachte das Land im Juli zum Ausdruck, zu einem Zeitpunkt also, als ein sowjetisches Veto bereits anachronistisch und wirkungslos gewesen wäre. It also offers new opportunities to individuals, to citizens living in the neighbourhood of the region of candidate countries. One reason is the globalisation and transformation in the extensive logistics systems employed in long-distance sea trade to serve in ever growing proportions the dumping of Chinese goods round the world, hub and spoke , as a consequence of which the open-sea Southern Italian, Southern Greek Crete and Maltese trans-shipment hub ports are obtaining a greater importance given their proximity to the shortest water route between the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar. We turn with distinguished interest towards the colourful culture of the region, and are also curious:
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German View all editions and formats Rating: We said that the one-sided orientation was justified in the 18th to 20th centuries, for answers to the vital issues of Hungarians were mostly given in the Western cities.
Moreover, it was the Western Great Powers that had drawn the borders of nation states in our region. The post unfolding of globalisation, however, offers new opportunities, among others also in societies outside the Euro-Atlantic space.
Paradoxically earlier, in the s and s, and with the passage of time the foreign affairs, party, administrative as well as commercial and cultural apparatus of the party-state could cleverly assert our national interests on the ripples of the political waters of the Soviet Union in that very Euro-Atlantic space.
It is silly — we kept on saying — to constantly subordinate national interests to the current political dogmas of ideology. As it was done by the post administration and corrected with so much achievement by the post apparatus despite Soviet occupation. Now, in , it should be added that we should recognise the eastern and south-eastern opportunities available to us at least at the time of the eastern enlargement of the European Union, and we should give up the one-sided Euro-Atlantic state foreign policy.
And it did happen in ! Neither the assertion of the post solutions Slovakia becoming independent and Yugoslavia disintegrating , nor the collapse of the post model the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from this space provoked actions from the Hungarian government towards the international powers. We did not speak about a territorial revision but about safeguarding minority rights at least to the extent as they were evolved after the peace treaties of and , which were not functioning after due to the Soviet presence.
Such a draft was drawn up in academic circles for the management of the minority issue: It was forwarded to forums of the European Union. And we distributed it in several languages also in Western and Eastern Europe. In the next period — pressing for an economic and political role to be taken up by Budapest also remained an intellectual grumble: The special issues of the space could have been exposed on that forum.
The differences of interests from those of the societies of Western and Northern Europe could have been presented either in the field of the migration of labour, or of agricultural products and spatial development. These were topics where our lack of preparation has, subsequently, caused great disadvantages. And this lack of preparation may even qualify as a political mistake. Today, when we are writing the first summaries of the history of the period, we are vigorously asking how far state administration helped the Hungarian society to prepare itself for receiving the norms of the EU and managing their effects between and Or, why at least the state specialist and self-government apparatus was not prepared for the local implementation of the Union norms?
Why were they not prepared for discussions with the Union bureaucrats, or at least for asserting local interests? The historian of posterity is expected to express serious condemnation in this field, too.
It cut off those links that were developed practically in all parts of the world on the basis of bad or good considerations by foreign policy between and From and on the state at last became an open one, trade, enterprise and the movement of persons became free, and was relieved of the limitations of the Cold War. And precisely then administration cut off links of representation, links that offered success and advancement to us, to the great sorrow of us, world wandering intellectuals, tradesmen and entrepreneurs.
Meanwhile, the internal administration of self-governments and the state specialist one was once again swelled on the basis of party political and ideological considerations after An introverted political thinking, unilaterally preferring domestic political power struggles had become dominant in Hungary, which failed to recognise that every single classroom, workplace and office was part of a global competition at the turn of the millennium.
And it was not recognised that the existence of a small nation and state a small community of taxpayers is more dependent on global outlook than ever before. Incidentally, does or did any of the administrations have a vision of what kind of community of Hungarian citizens and nation is envisaged for the 21st century?
This question was put by us repeatedly during the past fifteen years. We imagine a citizen open to the world and moving as an entrepreneur in it culturally and as an employee or investor as well. And we have imagined and still imagine a state that helps its citizens to acquire global competitiveness. It would help them, among others, by maintaining a stronger-than-average administration of foreign affairs, and not only in the Ministry.
Well, this has not happened. In we could add: According to our experience it is being done also in the Member States of the EU. The globalisation of specialist administrations. Harmony between following the common foreign policy of the EU and the representation of the interests of the nation state. The unfolding of integration in global dimension taking place parallel to the Union and European integration, and representing the interests of the nation state within it. Let us see them item by item.
The internationalisation of specialist policies. Historians are fully aware of the fact that the foreign relations of the country are not limited to state administration in the modern age, but extend over the system of international companies and cultural and scientific institutions.
And they also know that international inter-state organisations have been formed by branches , including global ones ever since the beginning of the century in the field of trade and economy as well as of culture. Specialised policies are also being conducted on the international scene, following the globalisation of production, trade and cultural and scientific activities. This trend also requires the specialist portfolios of states to conduct active international specialist foreign policy.
Another of its specificities is the setting up of so-called inter-ministerial committees and organisations. A partial objective of it is to counter-balance over-specialisation hindering a proper survey of issues, with the aim of creating harmony between the international activities of branches and the foreign affairs apparatus of the state. These conflicts became clear to many of us in the Hungarian state organisation and also in the state organisation of the Union when monitoring of the candidate countries for the European Union began in at a time when Hungary still performed very well.
How far the administrators of the special fields, and first of all units of production and services could be prepared for the Union norms? Did preparation for the EU excessively focused on the Foreign Ministry function well? In our view actually a governmental mistake was made. The interests of the common EU foreign policy and the foreign policies of the individual Member States.
It is visible right now, in the summer of , that the Lisbon ideas projecting the European Union as one of the strongest spatial administrations of world economy by were rather wishful thinking only.
Undoubtedly it is already seen that the EU failed to operate the available economic and labour potential with the required efficiency. Or, would the British be right who would still prefer a Union as a federation of associate states in a looser linkage?
The Iraq war has spectacularly shaken the unity of the EU in the field of foreign policy. It has become clear that the autonomous movement of interest alliances of nation states and of their administrations is far stronger than the European and even European Union links.
At the same place a question was put by a researcher whether we had any comprehensive ideas about the extent of the shrinking of the staff of nation-state administrations with the emergence of the common administration of the EU.
The question was received by appreciating and self-critical laughter breaking out spontaneously. The preparedness of the special administration of the newly admitted countries for the implementation of the common harmonisations with the EU was discussed with the same doubts in May in Aachen. The contributions of the expert reporters, however, were full of figures testifying that the acceding countries were unable to present their preparedness for harmonisation, or a required knowledge of Europe and the adequate language skills.
In those fields of life that are more independent of party politics. Naturally, this tendency would make the reconsideration of the century-old division of labour between the various specialist portfolios and the foreign ministry necessary within the state administration. Today it is not yet seen exactly how the continental and nation-state administrations would be organically connected.
There are uncertainties present in the administration of every Member State. Global-level and continental European integration have been progressing side by side. Incidentally, in , in the year of the birth of the European Union it could not be seen precisely what wave of integration would be brought about by information technology, by the scientific and technological revolution of our age in the second part of the s. And it is going to reshape the administrative units, too.
It would produce hitherto never seen global associations of specialisations and branches; it is already creating entirely new interest alliances in the different points of the world. To put it simply: The globalisation of market organisation would split up the interest communities of geographic and territorial integrations. Or to subordinate relationships that link the individual Member States or their smaller productive units to an integration emerging in another part of the world, or to nation states.
It is beyond doubt that the foreign ministries as well as specialist ministries of the Union Member States would strive to assert the interests of their citizens in the world market even if it runs counter to continental interests. The points of consideration could be listed further by us or by others, prominent authors on foreign affairs literature filling libraries or active foreign politicians that could be taken into account when shaping a new strategy of foreign affairs.
We are sure only in one thing, namely that Hungary of little revenue income and few citizens needs a strategy of foreign policy. It is made necessary by changes taking place in the Union as well as in world economy and policy. And it is made necessary by world competition unfolding on the level of the individual, too. And not against the extent how far it serves its impulses, emotions and aversions, as it does today.
We have been speaking about the necessary changes in foreign political thinking, about changes not only in state foreign policy, but in the thinking of the society as a whole. And first of all we are speaking about changes in the thinking of entrepreneurs and investors, and of the intellectuals. There is a need for change in their way of daily thinking, when they design their everyday aims in life, their vocation and occupation, the education of their children, or just their enterprising investments.
Integration of planetary dimensions as well as within the EU, and its Southeast European enlargement would offer a framework of life the size of which is impossible to comprehend as yet. And it also offers a new set of tools, a new, digitalised set of communication to it. The radius of thinking and life has never before widened so suddenly and embracing such space in the five thousand years of modern human history.
All those opportunities that are offered by this expansion of the radius in the field of investments, the creation of new production systems and the enrichment of knowledge primarily offer space to the middle classes of entrepreneurs and intellectuals. These are challenges for their daily activities.
How far are these middle strata preparing for the new age of integration? We have information in some areas, but they are quite discouraging. One can hardly find teaching of European skills in our universities, such as our faculties of arts. And there are even fewer where this kind of learning is pursued in foreign languages. The knowledge of foreign languages of our students may be adequate on paper, but as practicing teachers, and this is the unanimous experience of professors in the capital city, we find that their actual operational knowledge of foreign languages is not any better than it was in the second half of the s.
And what is even sadder the level of their understanding of literature related to their subject has definitely declined even in their mother tongue. The presence of the knowledge of world history has not improved in the university and college education, and strangely enough, interest in these topics has also decreased.
When talking about these phenomena our teacher colleagues sadly say that the proportion of knowledge in world economy and culture has become weaker in the media and primarily in television than it used to be prior to the system change.
Everything is suppressed by party political cock-fighting and scatter-brains as well as by the cult of criminal violence. Hence instead of debates we rather urge for the mobilisation of civil society and the joining of the forces of the private and public spheres. The groups of researchers and professors have been formed already during the National Strategic Research Programme, launched by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in They have allied to explore the alternatives opening up before the Hungarian state and Hungarians at the turn of the millennium.
The programmes included were assessing the level of water management, agriculture, transport, our system of spatial administration, the culture of a small language, our social care system, the harmonisation of our institutions with the European Union, energy management, the protection of nature, etc.
We decided on launching a series of conferences discussing the consequences and opportunities of the south-eastern enlargement of the EU, with the participation of academic experts and the entrepreneurial sphere, as well as governmental and civil organisations. We decided upon the creation of a homepage and its operation as an electronic periodical to be updated monthly. In Hungarian, for the time being, but also in English from the second half of The homepage contains the texts of presentations and contributions to those conferences.
The edited texts are also to be published in Hungarian and in English. The Balkan Project was launched in October The Programme Committee has members from Hungarian institutes of the HAS, of universities as well as representatives of foreign institutions Austria, Slovakia, and Romania besides the initiator Europe Institute Budapest. The idea was supported by the then Foreign Minister Mr Ferenc Somogyi, who kindly accepted to give the first talk at the opening conference.
Between November and October we held conferences altogether six on the following issues: What human rights conflicts would be strengthened in the Union by the accession of the Balkan region and the gradual admission of its states into the European Union? What prospects Hungary and the states of the Carpathian basin have at the building of the new European transport corridors? What role the Danube may play as a European transport corridor the seventh and the Carpathian basin in general in the water management of South-Eastern Europe?
What common problems may be caused by the intercontinental changes of climate in the Carpathian basin and in the Balkan region? Into what new world economic environment would the Balkan region be included and what kind of opportunities open up for Hungary during the enlargement of the EU? Would the Balkan states and those of the Carpathian basin be competitors or regions of co-operation in food production? Now the readers may receive the edited variant of the presentations of these conferences, and they are recommended to click on homepage www.
We are glad to see that our modest initiative has been only one of those actions that encourage state policy since our accession to the EU in to develop a more marked concept of foreign policy. Moreover, they are challenging even the foreign political preferences of the previous years.
How would the result of our effort manifest itself is unknown. He is one of the founders of the Europe Institute who has advanced finances for several years for the expenses of our location in the university. Meanwhile we are not only grumbling, not only simply criticising, but are making recommendations. We wish to promote thinking about our place in the world, in Europe and in Central-Eastern Europe. The Balkan region constitutes a periphery of geography, economy and traffic Figure 1 , but at the same time it is also an intercontinental, Oriental link.
Crossing the Balkans today depends on the serviceability of international transport corridors affected by the configuration of terrain and political circumstances. The situation is aggravated by socio-economic backwardness, regional interests and the multitude of conflicts. As a result, the majority of the region is characterised by poor transport conditions.
In WWII the opposing sides assessed the unfavourable topographic conditions of the Balkans that was of secondary significance as a front differently from the angle of armoured military operations. Guderian, the German General, wrote: The following constitutes the possible functions which the Balkans may fulfil within the European traffic network system:. External power- and economic interests have exerted a decisive influence on this historical transit role.
The British and the Germans tended towards concepts of a trans-Eurasian railway, in line with the Porte plans. From a geo-strategic perspective the Eastern Balkans took on increasing relevance rather for the Germans though with their later Drang nach Osten eastward expansion policy and the Baghdad railway.
The Suez Canal played an orienting role, for the British were interested in the gateway of Thessalonica. Within the synthetic state of inter-war Yugoslavia the north-west — south-east international transit axis assumed a role in strengthening domestic cohesion. The years between and were characterised by strong political divisiveness and this transit function ceased. The European Community, and European Union are characterised by the contradiction between a unified market demanding an interoperable infrastructural system and traffic system which is not harmonised.
Conditions for crossing and interoperability, both aspects of cohesion policy; sustainability which demands a high-standard, modern energy and environment policy; and a more balanced regional growth, as part of the regional policy, have all become necessary in the interests of making Europe more effective and more competitive within the global market.
A linear, sustainable, environment friendly infrastructural system is required in order to create a more competitive, coherent and balanced Europe. The Trans-European Networks TEN , the development of a linear infrastructure for an integrated system of routes national trunk route networks on a European scale. The principal considerations for development are that it should take place within a technologically and operationally unified system; be in compliance with guiding principles of subsidiarity; it should concentrate on the corridors connecting countries and capital cities; and should give preference to high performance, environment friendly means of transport, such as electrified railways, sea and inland water navigation.
Following the cessation of hostilities in the Balkan war, the network was completed with the north-west — south-east, in addition to the north—south X and Vc corridors cutting across the Balkans.
Among the ten corridors, four primary corridors, namely V, IV, IX and X, and a number of subsidiary corridors start far away and end at Balkan seaports; the lower stretch of the Danube as an inland water navigation axis creates a link with the Black Sea — all of which promote dependence on Western and Central Europe.
There is only one single South Balkan corridor that starts and ends within the Balkans Figure 4. An overwhelming majority of the corridors radiate from Budapest and extend into the Balkans — the road from South-Eastern Europe leading to Western Europe both figuratively and literally crosses the Carpathian Basin, i. The radial corridors then subdivide further within the Balkans , and from another direction over Eastern Europe and Austria, linking up to create hubs in the Balkan capital cities, those of less significance linking up in certain larger economic centres.
The total sum of the corridor investment may not exceed 1. The reason given for this is that from the European Union perspective this is of extraordinary geopolitical significance, fulfilling an exceptionally important role in linking regions carrying strategically important traffic:.
Plans appearing as priority projects on the list Quick Start Project of TEN-T projects involving the Balkans are merely segments which do not form a continuous, coherent network.
According to PEN documents, the full length of the railways should be electrified and made capable of bearing large axis pressure and for the most part should be developed into two-line tracks, while the main trunk roads have to be developed into clearways predominantly motorways by It is more than doubtful whether they will be completed in time.
Significant differences can be evidenced between the practice of the Balkan countries and the EU directives on traffic policy with regard to the scale of railway and motorway development. The European Union, paying great attention to environmental aspects, gives priority to the development of electrified railways and waterways, while in light of the extremely backward road network in comparison to Western Europe, and the resultant economic losses, the countries of South-Eastern Europe have concentrated on the construction of motorways and clearways, and essentially link the larger scale railway developments to gaining access to Union resources.
While among the corridors themselves the greatest shortfall is precisely in the technical standard of the railways, they are building motorways which do not belong to the corridors for example, the Northern Transylvanian motorway or the Dalmatian coastal railway all the way down to Greece. The Balkan network is being built within a structure that the inherent strategic alternatives should in any case ensure a transport connection with the EU core regions.
In peace time, connections would ideally be maintained and accessed by means of the Central and Northern Balkans, the Carpathian Basin and corridors running south—north, as well as south-east and north-west. The extremely expensive, high-speed railway construction in Greece should fit into this version Figure 5. This, for the time being, is an anachronistic investment, since its continuation across the Southern Slavic regions and Hungary to the existing German network will demand an incalculable amount of time and until then, in isolation, can only serve domestic traffic.
In troubled times, and in times leading up to military operations, the corridors running east—west by-passing the Southern Slavic region Figure 6 , and capable of carrying traffic to Western Europe across Italy in the south and Hungary in the north, gain a greater significance. During the years of civil war in the s, the traffic of goods between Turkey and Greece, and Western Europe could be managed mostly by means of the insertion of ferry boats between ports in Western Greece and ports in Southern Italy or the Northern Adriatic.
Today, the traffic has, for the most part, again reverted to the Vardar-Morava mainland corridor but shipment combined with sea transport still remains significant. The effects of corridors on spatial and settlement development are contradictory. To a great extent they improve the conditions in terms of capacity, quality and speed of long-distance international traffic between capital cities , while attracting business concerns, i.
This is how strips or zones of land, excelling in GDP production, emerge, together with contact zones beside motorways as well as high-energy centres at intersection points of existing corridors that provide outstanding performance. At the same time, over long distances the corridors with their prevalent draining effect accelerate the emptying and dumping of the outlying peripheral rural areas , with the end result of en hancing regional differences.
The differentiation processes to which these reasons may be traced back even in Western Europe worked against a regional policy striving for harmonious growth. The fable of Menenius Agrippa already makes reference to the indispensability of functional harmony between the limbs and the trunk with the stomach inside. To place this classical anecdote in a transport policy context, trunk road traffic originates chiefly from subsidiary roads, and if the feeding system dries up the system it feeds will likewise waste away.
Therefore, in the future, a development policy is required which places great emphasis on the construction of a modern subsidiary road and also a partly subsidiary railway network, in addition to implementing measures to slow the growing volume of long-distance traffic, such as strengthening the local economy and society, and to base on local sources. By reason of the differences in density of network, in addition to the differences in the intensity of traffic and in the significance of connections thereby created, the construction of the corridors influences to varying extent the economic growth and demographic conditions of the larger regions.
The most extensive regions lying away from the corridors are the Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian highland regions of the Western and Central Balkans, as well as Transylvania. All indications point to the fact that — under peaceful conditions — the most dynamic corridor will be the one running north-west — south-east which today already strings together the relatively most developed capital city agglomerations of Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Sofia and Istanbul.
Though the intensity of traffic in annual average of the twin corridors V and Vb to the north-east and terminating at the Northern Adriatic ports lag behind only to an extent not reaching scale, due to their short length their effect may only be asserted over comparatively small areas.
The fundamental characteristics of the Balkan regional structure were shaped several centuries earlier and as such the corridor network for a good time to come will not be capable of changing them ; then again, as time passes, when the other corridors have been built and intra-Balkan economic and cultural relations, as well as those enjoyed with the Eastern Slavic countries will be much stronger than those of today, the corridor network will become functionally more balanced.
In Helsinki this corridor was included into the PEN network with the intention of creating a connection with Western Europe across Hungary for the isolated Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to experience, however, the several hundred thousand guest workers, and their twice as many family members, employed in German-speaking countries, not to mention Bosnian-Herzegovinian travellers visiting Western Europe regularly for business or other purposes, travel rather in a north-western direction via Zagreb and Ljubljana than through Hungary.
If, however, Hungary acquired a leading position not simply in terms of economic power but rather as one of the most important logistics centres in East Central Europe then the Vc could fulfil its intended role.
This variant would result for Hungary in that our No. The traffic value of the ports at the end of corridors has been differentiated thus far primarily in terms of their economic and traffic geography situations ; i. In the Northern Adriatic ports and the highly developed Alpine areas which are closer to the dynamic economy of the western region of the Carpathian Basin and the Czech Republic the proportion of valuable container and international transit goods is much higher than in the Black Sea ports predominantly loading mass-produced goods.
However, in the future , inland sea ports have to reckon with a comparative loss in value for at least two reasons. One reason is the globalisation and transformation in the extensive logistics systems employed in long-distance sea trade to serve in ever growing proportions the dumping of Chinese goods round the world, hub and spoke , as a consequence of which the open-sea Southern Italian, Southern Greek Crete and Maltese trans-shipment hub ports are obtaining a greater importance given their proximity to the shortest water route between the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.
The second factor is the problem of navigating through the Bosphorus. As a result traffic has become too heavy, slowing down daytime shipping to the extent that the resultant congestion on the Bosphorus has left ships on many occasions having to wait to gain entry. Die Historische Kommission der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften veranstaltete zwischen 8. Obwohl die Alliierten in der Moskauer Deklaration vom Dies erkennt man vor allem an der Einrichtung eines Alliierten Rates und einer Alliierten Kommission, an der Aufteilung Österreichs in vier Besatzungszonen, an der Demilitarisierung Österreichs, an den Demontagen in der sowjetischen und teilweise auch französischen Besatzungszone und an der sofortigen Absetzung aller NS-Funktionsträger.
Freilich waren auch die österreichischen Verluste überdimensional: Bis verlief die Entnazifizierung mit einer gewissen Härte — so wurden kurzfristig Die Demarkationslinie zwischen der sowjetischen Besatzungszone in Niederösterreich, dem Burgenland, dem oberösterreichischen Mühlviertel, sowie in mehreren Wiener Bezirken 2.
Februar in Moskau dem Politbüromitglied Andrej A. Zhdanow vorschlugen, ihre Taktik darauf aufzubauen, dass die sowjetischen Truppen noch länger auf dem Territorium Österreichs bleiben sollten, wurde ihnen deutlich gesagt, dass das Zentralkomitee der KPdSU damit nicht einverstanden sei.
Und auch der Vorschlag der österreichischen Genossen, eine Teilung Österreichs anzustreben, erhielt eine klare Abfuhr. September dar, die im sowjetischen Sektor in Wien begann und von der KPÖ in Richtung eines Generalstreiks auszunützen versucht wurde. Trotz Ausgreifens des Streiks auf Niederösterreich, Oberösterreich und die Steiermark gelang es der Regierung und dem ÖGB mit erfolgreicher Gegenpropaganda — und teilweise auch mit Brachialgewalt — die Streikbewegung einzudämmen.
Jänner zu belassen. Damit waren österreichische Spekulationen auf Südtirol — die bereits durch den Friedensvertrag mit Italien erledigt worden waren — oder das Berchtesgadener Land ebenso obsolet wie jugoslawische Gebietsforderungen in Unterkärnten und in der südlichen Steiermark.
Molotow hatte seinem jugoslawischen Kollegen Edvard Kardelj bereits im April in Moskau nahe gelegt, seine Forderungen deutlich zu reduzieren, worauf sich die jugoslawische Seite bis auf die Minimalforderung nach den beiden während des Krieges gebauten Draukraftwerke Schwabegg und Lavamünd zurückzog. Immerhin waren dies Wirtschafts- und sicherheitspolitische Gründe veranlassten die jugoslawische Führung, eine Annäherung an Österreich zu suchen und den Abschluss des Staatsvertrages zu fördern.
So benötigte etwa Jugoslawien dringend österreichische Traktoren, um seine nach Vertreibung der Deutschen, Magyaren und Italiener heruntergekommene Landwirtschaft zu modernisieren. Und Marschall Tito war sehr an einem raschen Abzug der Roten Armee aus Österreich und einer künftigen Neutralität Österreichs gelegen, um im mittleren Europa eine blockfreie Zone zu schaffen.
Das Hauptziel der österreichischen Bemühungen um die Erlangung des Staatsvertrags war das Ende der Vier-Mächte-Kontrolle und der Rückzug der Besatzungstruppen aus Österreich, und zwar insbesondere der Rückzug der sowjetischen Streitkräfte. De facto waren die alliierten Truppen aber Besatzungstruppen zweier einander feindselig gegenüberstehenden Machtblöcke geworden, die im Kriegsfall auch Österreich zu einem Schlachtfeld gemacht hätten.
Wenn wir vom Jahre ausgehen, wäre also die sowjetische Ölförderung in Österreich bis möglich gewesen, also praktisch bis zum Ende des Sowjetimperiums. Erst im Frühjahr ergaben sich neue Perspektiven: Bereits in Gesprächen zwischen sowjetischen und österreichischen Diplomaten im Herbst war deutlich geworden, dass die Sowjetunion Ostösterreich sicher nicht aus der Hand geben würde, solange das Risiko eines NATO-Beitritts Österreichs bestand.
Die sozialistischen Bedenken gegen den Begriff Neutralität hatten überwiegend mit der kommunistischen Neutralitäts-Propaganda zu tun, aber auch mit der Sorge, dadurch von den Westmächten abgekoppelt zu werden. Dulles in einem Vier-Augen-Gespräch mit Molotow am Februar deutlich gemacht: Moskau versuchte das Projekt einer Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, in dem die Bundesrepublik Deutschland integriert sein sollte, ohne direkt Mitglied der NATO zu werden, zu torpedieren; und tatsächlich kam das Projekt auch im August in der Pariser Nationalversammlung zu Fall.
Moskau versuchte nun neuerlich — mit allen Mitteln der Diplomatie und Propaganda — den Ratifikationsprozess der Pariser Verträge zu verhindern oder zumindest zu verzögern. Neuerlich hoffte man auf die französischen Parlamentarier. Aber im März passierten die Pariser Verträge auch den französischen Rat der Republik, und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wurde am 5. Auch wenn die Österreichlösung wohl nicht als Modell für ein neutrales Gesamtdeutschland gedacht war, so hatte sich Moskau — und hier vor allem Malenkow und Molotow — die Österreichfrage offensichtlich doch bis zuletzt als Verhandlungsobjekt zurückbehalten wollen.
Schon in einem Brief vom Juni an Tito strebte er neue politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Beziehungen zu Jugoslawien an. Jänner konnte Chruschtschow seinen Rivalen Georgij M. Malenkow — dem er u. Bulganin als Ministerpräsidenten ersetzen. Der jugoslawische Staatschef reagierte postwendend mit heftiger öffentlicher Kritik an Molotow. Umso erstaunlicher, dass am März die Parteizeitung Prawda und die Regierungszeitung Izvestija diese Kritik veröffentlichten, was einer öffentlichen Desavouierung Molotows gleichkam.
Und Raab hatte einige Mühe, seinen sozialistischen Koalitionspartner Schärf zum Nachgeben zu bewegen. Freilich setzten erst die Westalliierten auf der Wiener Botschafterkonferenz zwischen 2. Mai die Verankerung der sowjetischen Wirtschaftskonzessionen im Staatsvertrag durch. Der Rückkauf des Erdölkomplexes war hingegen relativ günstig, da die Erträge nach höher lagen, als die Schätzungen vorhersahen. Viel schwerer waren die Verluste Österreichs infolge der sowjetischen Erdölgewinnung bis Insgesamt dürfte Österreich die zehnjährige Besatzung etwa 1,5 Milliarden Dollar gekostet haben, ziemlich genau der Betrag den es andererseits aus der Marshallplan-Hilfe bezog.
Für die Sowjetunion war es gemeinsam mit der Bereitschaft zur österreichischen Neutralitätserklärung eine ausreichende Garantie, dass Österreich nicht der NATO beitreten werde. Für die Westalliierten war der Staatsvertrag eine ausreichende Garantie, dass sich im endgültig von Teilungsängsten befreiten Österreich eine westlich orientierte Demokratie durchsetzen werde.
Dies mag mit dazu beigetragen zu haben, dass in Österreich die grundsätzliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus lange hinausgeschoben wurde, und dass eine Reihe von Restitution- und Entschädigungsfragen erst von der Regierung Schüssel gelöst wurden. Ohne Zweifel gab der Staatsvertrag vom Und Österreich hat diese Chance tatsächlich genützt.
Sowjetische Politik in Österreich Dokumente aus russischen Archiven, hg. Dezember , sowie von J. Sowjetische Politik in Österreich, Dok.
Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im Jahrhundert Wien Protokoll des Gesprächs von A. Der österreichische Staatsvertrag Internationaler Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationaler Identität, hg. Mai ; zu den sowjetischen Planungen vgl.
An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, , ed. Reden und Dokumente , hg. Zwischen Kaltem Krieg und Entspannung, hg. Der österreichische Staatsvertrag, From Stalin to Khrushchev Cambridge, Mass. Arhiv Srbije i Cme Gore, fond br. Tok konferencije jugoslovenske i sovjetske delegacije. Österreich und Deutschland Wien ; vgl. Zusammenfassungen und Einschätzungen Wien — München Im Zeitalter der Konfrontation zwischen den Supermächten setzten die internationalen Kräfteverhältnisse dem politischen Spielraum der kleinen Staaten, so auch dem Österreichs, von vorne herein enge Grenzen.
Zum Schutz ihrer Sicherheit boten sich ihnen lediglich zwei Möglichkeiten: Entweder der Anschluss an einen der Machtblöcke oder der Verbleib in dauerhafter Neutralität. Die Existenz des freien und unabhängigen Österreichs wurde durch den Staatsvertrag von garantiert. Auf seiner Grundlage verankerte die österreichische Bundesverfassung die Neutralität des Landes. Diese Bedingung formulierte der vierte Punkt des Staatsvertrages: Die auf diese Weise erfolgte Festlegung der internationalen Position des Landes gewährleistete nicht nur seinen Fortbestand als souveräner und ungeteilter Staat, sondern Österreich erfüllte aufgrund seiner Neutralität auch eine bedeutende Rolle im Prozess der Entspannung, insbesondere in Ostmitteleuropa, sowie bei der Bewahrung des Friedens und des politischen Gleichgewichts.
Auch die grundlegende innenpolitische Voraussetzung der Neutralität entstand nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, nämlich der feste Wille des österreichischen Volkes zur Bewahrung seiner Unabhängigkeit und sein Vertrauen in die wirtschaftliche Lebensfähigkeit des Landes. Diese innere Einstellung wird auch durch die Ergebnisse der Meinungsumfragen in den er Jahren unterstrichen, also nach nahezu drei Jahrzehnten der Erfahrung mit der Neutralität.
Etwa 80 Prozent der Befragten bevorzugten zu diesem Zeitpunkt die Neutralität gegenüber der Zugehörigkeit zu einem Bündnissystem. Ständige Neutralität bedeutet aber keinesfalls ideologische Neutralität. Österreich wie auch die anderen neutralen Staaten in Europa Schweiz, Schweden und Finnland identifizierten sich nämlich mit der westlichen Welt und der bürgerlichen Demokratie. Kanzler Josef Klaus betonte nicht zufällig gerade im September , am zweiten Tag der sowjetischen Intervention in der Tschechoslowakei: In der internationalen Politik ist es notwendig, zwischen Neutralität und Blockfreiheit zu unterscheiden.
Unter diesen sind kommunistische Länder Kuba und Vietnam ebenso vertreten, wie eindeutig westorientierte Staaten Singapur und Thailand. Die neutralen Länder in Europa hingegen waren eindeutig der pluralistischen Demokratie und der Marktwirtschaft verpflichtet. Neutralität bedeutete keineswegs Passivität oder Enthaltung in der internationalen Politik. Die österreichische Neutralität unterschied sich deutlich vom schweizerischen und vom schwedischen Modell und ähnelte vielmehr der finnischen Variante, und zwar in zweierlei Hinsicht.
Die Schweiz und Schweden verfügten demgegenüber über eine beträchtliche militärische Infrastruktur, eine entwickelte Rüstungsindustrie, autarke Waffengattungen und ein breites System der Bürgermiliz.
Auch ihre geostrategische Lage war wesentlich günstiger: Deshalb bevorzugten sie die bewaffnete Neutralität.
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